In such situations approval voting can produce winners who are more generally acceptable to the electorate than standard plurality voting. This is because the approval mechanism tends to prevent two candidates with broad appeal from splitting a majority constituency and electing a minority candidate.
Of these three TIMS contests two would have had different winners had approval voting been binding.
In the first election with candidates A, B, and C, C narrowly beat B in the regular election, but B was the approval winner because considerably more of A's supporters approved of B than C. In the second election approval and plurality voting agreed on the winner. In the third election with two positions to be filled from a field of five candidates. A, B, C, D, and E, B was a winner by either method, but the official second winner. A, placed fourth in the approval vote behind C and D.
Close examination of ranking data shows that in the first election a head to head contest between B and C would be a toss up. Nevertheless, because of secondary support, B is a better choice by the criterion of broad acceptance by the electorate. In the third election C and D are similarly close but either would have broader support than the plurality choice A and of the two C has somewhat broader general approval. In Table I the extrapolated totals take account of the f)eople who submitted an official Table 7 "official plurality vote"). None of the discrepancies affects our conclusions. Table 8 .
